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In Metaphysics of Morals, paragraph 44, Kant notes that ―before a 
public law condition is established ... individual human beings, peoples 
and states can never be secure against the violence from one another, since 
each has its [?!] own right to do what seems right and good to it (aus 
jedem seinem eigenen Recht, zu tun, was ihm recht und gut dünkt) and not 
to be dependent upon another‘s opinion about this.‖1 
We should note that here we have an array of ―individual human 
beings‖, ―peoples‖, and ―states‖. The rest of the paragraph, however, 
seems to deal with us as individuals, in a direct manner, and only 
indirectly with the ―peoples‖ and ―states‖.2 
There is a powerful ambivalence here, especially if we compare the 
very strong wording at the beginning of the paragraph 44: ―It is not 
experience from which we learn the maxim of violence..., it is not some 
deed (Faktum) that makes coercion through public law necessary....—on 
the contrary... it lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (a 
condition that is not rightful).‖ The ambivalence is here perhaps not yet 
visible, except in the shift from a set of three (individuals, peoples, and 
states), none of which can be secure from violence, to a formulation which 
seems to shrink to individuals who must leave the state of nature and, at all 
costs, enter a civil condition. This paragraph in Metaphysics of Morals is 
in full accord with the Seventh Thesis from the ―Idea for Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Intent‖: ―...establishing a perfect civil constitution is 
dependent on foreign relations,‖ because the state of nature present in 
existing anarchical international affairs is making security against violence 
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still very far ahead—and there is no ―civil condition‖, i.e. ―rightful 
condition‖ in the international arena.3 The concepts of ―a priori‖ and 
―independence of any factuality‖—very strong concepts, to be sure – 
appear to have the same validity on all three levels: of individuals, 
peoples, and states. It seems that abandoning the state of nature at only one 
level of those three would not suffice for a rightful, lawful condition to be 
established before the state of nature has been abandoned at all three 
levels. This means that before the state of nature has been overcome in 
international affairs, domestic rights in states are doomed to be 
provisional, tentative and uncertain, which is the opposite of what they are 
supposed to be. Does this mean that at an international level each may 
compel the other by force to leave the state of nature by introducing 
universally obligatory, peremptory, laws?
4
 The ―other‖ here are states with 
established internal civil conditions and valid and effective laws (Cavallar, 
1999:5). Accordingly, peoples and states should also leave the state of 
nature for peace to be secured. Until then, there will be a right to impel 
them to it by force. This means, quite in line with the definition of the state 
of nature, that war is a default state of affairs, whereas peace is only a goal 
for which to strive. Consequently, a peace that exists within states only, 
one which is not also a world peace, would be both incomplete and 
uncertain. 
The ambivalence seems to become visible in a tension between this ―a 
priori‖ approach and the logic by which the laws, necessary to leave the 
state of nature and enter a civil condition, have to be articulated: they have 
to be articulated in freedom, in autonomy of the agents which ―enter‖ the 
new condition, and this manifests itself through consent. We know this 
fact, but it is still odd: in order to be just, the laws must be endorsed, 
authorized, not imposed, and this regardless of all other characteristics or 
features they have. Laws relate to our external freedom, but external 
freedom is still freedom: it is part of the totality of freedom, the same one 
that we brought (actually have to bring) from the state of nature (as the 
same freedom that we had, or have had, in that state). External freedom is 
not supposed to be a kind of slavery, or a domain in which freedom has 
lost its essence of being the capacity to decide, a capacity which is a kind 
of power. In a civil condition, freedom is limited. It is only part of what it 
was in the state of nature—but that part is still freedom and the best part of 
it indeed. In a practical sense, freedom is efficiently, in a practical sense, 
working in both parts, designating the legitimate freedom part (1) and the 
restricted part (2). In the area of legitimate freedom we can freely set our 
goals and attempt to realize them—resuming responsibility for the success 
and failure in their realization. 
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In the area of freedom that is restricted by laws, freedom is present in 
the structure of the necessity of consent: without consent the restriction is 
not valid, but at the same time the consent has to be free, not enforced by 
compulsion or coercion. There is no requirement for the consent to be 
given, and the act of giving consent is a fact, not a matter of analytical 
truth! The normative reasoning power driving for the provision of consent 
contains necessity, but of a normative kind. Moreover, the necessitation 
we have in the ―necessity‖ contained in duty, as Kant says: ―Duty is the 
necessity of an action from respect for the law‖—is not a real necessity but 
only a normative one [not that something necessarily will be realized but 
that it is necessary that it ought to be realized, and this independently of 
the difference ―from duty‖/―in accordance with duty‖ distinction] (Kant, 
4:400n). But, of course, it did not have to be realized. Thus, the normative 
necessity to give consent to laws is not a factual necessity but only a 
pressure of reasons directing our decision to a rational conclusion to give 
consent. 
This pressure is not even primarily of a moral kind but rather purely 
rational, based in autonomy but expressing our (best) heteronomy: rational 
self-interest. All that pressure, however, is not sufficient to entail a real 
necessity in the sense that the result, the act of giving consent, could be 
―derived‖ from the content of the laws. What laws will be, will depend in a 
crucial part on what the real interests are. And the real interests depend on 
who’s interests these are, and what happened before. Too many 
uncertainties, and one variable is determining the most basic interests of 
anyone. Uncertainties refer to the events that ―happened before,‖ and the 
variable is the identity of the person(s) who is or are the holder(s) of 
freedom. We may conclude that the ―necessity‖ we deal with here is at 
most an urgency to give consent, without specifying what the content of 
this consent is. Taking this into account, it is arrogant to presume that 
everyone‘s decision will be the same, that the interests and their hierarchy 
will be the same in all humans. The pressure to make a civil condition 
should suffice to facilitate the decision, but which decision it will be in full 
precision has not yet been determined in this process. 
Hence, on one side we have a normative thesis setting up a priori 
principles that say that before we leave the state of nature we do not have 
full peace (Kant, 6:312), that any legal constitution is better than none at 
all (Kant, 6:320), that we must leave the state of nature and establish true 
peace, thereby overcoming war (Kant, 6:344). This is a demand of reason 
(Kant, 6:312). The realization of this demand takes time, and it can be 
incomplete or deficient. These problems, i.e. deficiency and 
incompleteness, are signs of the presence of some remnants of the state of 
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nature. This is most visible in the international arena where we still have a 
kind of anarchy. The demand of reason is to put an end to such a state of 
affairs by establishing a truly global juridical condition. 
On the other side, we have what Kant calls ―truce‖, a ―mere truce, a 
suspension of hostilities, not peace‖ (Kant, 8:343), a state of temporary 
peace, even if it is a result of a peace treaty with the victory of one and 
capitulation of the other side (Kant, 8:355). Truce is a solid concept in 
Kant, much richer in content than our first impression might suggest. It 
also might be different from the dictionary meaning of the term. It is a 
concept worth exploring. There are two moments I have in mind here. 
First, Kant‘s peace treaty, or peace pact (depending on the translation) as 
the end of a particular war, may have as a result that ―a current war can be 
brought to an end but not a condition of war‖ (Kant, 8:355, my emphasis). 
Our normal linguistic intuition is that truce is only a pause in an ongoing 
war. According to Kant, however, a peace treaty cannot end the condition 
of war, because ―right cannot be decided by war and its favourable 
outcome, victory―.5 A possibility of future conflicts, namely, always 
remains an option. Even after the end of war (concluded with a peace 
treaty) we still have only a ―truce,‖ a kind of state of nature, not real 
peace.
6
 Second, states have already abandoned the state of nature, and 
―what holds in accordance with natural right for beings in a lawless 
condition, [i. e.] ‗they ought to leave this condition‘, cannot hold for states 
in accordance with the right of nations (since, as states, they already have 
a rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the constraint of 
others to bring them under a more extended law-governed constitution...‖ 
(Kant, 8:355, my emphasis). Thus truce, which characterizes the 
anarchical international society, is not a state of nature! And the 
ambivalence is fully visible now. Truce of this kind is the true nature of 
the world: wars are always possible, and peace, which actually is a truce, 
is a state of affairs in which that possibility has been successfully avoided. 
War is a latent but real possibility—a very expensive and often also 
unnecessary, immoral, even absurd possibility, similar to many related 
ones we all always have within our reach, in the domain of our freedom 
(but not such to be considered as the objects of prospective decisions). 
Nearly all of these options, however, can in some extraordinary 
circumstances become feasible (like, for example, to cry and shout aloud: 
it would be very improper for me to do that here at my  desk, or in the 
middle of the lecturing, but if I am falling from a cliff it would suddenly 
become very proper and feasible). 
In other words, being in a state of truce is in a way sufficient for us to 
say that we are not in a pure state of nature. Truce is more than the 
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absence of any constraint. Precisely because of that the right ―to impel the 
other by force to leave the state of nature by introducing obligatory, 
peremptory, laws,‖ which is a feature of the state of nature, does not seem 
to be applicable in the state of truce. Truce seems to be more a kind of 
peace than a segment of a war. Were it not, we would have a right to impel 
(all?) others to abandon this condition in order to reach true peace. It 
would have to proceed in two steps: first, individuals would need to 
relinquish their wild, unrestricted freedom for a limited but guaranteed 
freedom provided by the laws of the state. Afterwards, the states, which 
are to be taken as (artificial?) moral persons, would need to move further 
and finalize the process by entering a lawful state of cosmopolitan peace 
which would not be any kind of ―truce.‖ The problem with this is the 
following: it would be hard to avoid destroying internal law and order in 
the process of creating a viable global juridical condition. This might be 
the reason why Kant claims that, in regarding the state of nature, what 
holds for individuals cannot hold for states: it seems very unlikely, or 
impossible, not to destroy the structure of order and peace already created 
by the abandonment of the lawless natural condition in the renewed 
process on the second level (Maus, 2010). Strictly speaking, if this new 
world order is to be created according to the demand of reason, all states 
and their laws should be reconsidered and revised. Otherwise, the 
strongest state(s) would impose its (their) laws as the unquestioned 
authority of what is to be considered as the sole normative standard. In the 
process all other authorities would have to withdraw or be cleared. Many 
pitfalls are looming here. For example, no one would know if one is 
obeying the law, if in what she is doing she is acting in accordance with 
any domestic law, because it could turn out later that this is different from 
the newly, ex post facto, created global law. The result would be utter 
uncertainty regarding any transitional period (except perhaps the ones 
buried in the deeper past). But this is only one example. 
The main point is that the internal, domestic laws, by losing their 
normative authority, would lose their role in facilitating ―the abandonment 
of the state of nature.‖ It seems that any attempt to realize a world peace 
would then imply a kind of revolution which necessarily would destroy 
most of order and peace attained so far. This would be at odds with Kant‘s 
claim that ―any legal constitution, even if it is only in small measure 
lawful, is better than none at all‖ (Kant, 8:373n). The other, even more far-
reaching problem, could be the question whether the goal of a world state 
is attainable at all. Another issue is: is such a goal worthwhile - a point 
which finds its explicit corroboration in Kant‘s idea of ―soulless 
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despotism‖ of a world empire.7 Either way, this is a subject worth of 
further exploration.  
My own thesis is that ―peace‖ is a name for a state of affairs which 
acquires its meaning only in relation to its opposite, i.e. to the absence of 
peace. According to Kant, that absence is the state of nature defined as the 
state of war (Kant, 6:344). What really is ―eternal‖ here are only 
possibilities, both of peace and war. Peace and war are to be defined in 
relation to each other. Peace is, prima facie, positive, war negative. But 
this is only prima facie; because peace can be unjust, contain slavery, 
humiliation, discrimination, inequality, exploitation, disrespect, etc. We 
may object that all these are features of peace as truce—not of real, true 
peace, which would be the total opposite of anything contained in war. But 
what is contained in war? What is the purpose and meaning of war, the 
purpose and meaning which may lead to some justification of it? Putting 
aside notions of the (possible) eschatological purpose of war (according to 
which war is a necessary and appropriate means that leads to ultimate 
peace),
8
 adequate descriptions of peace and war ought to be connected 
with a specification of the role laws play in both schemes. More to the 
point, both war and peace have to be articulated in two ways in the context 
of time. First, in time as the frame of possibilities at a specific 
chronological point defined through previous time and thus determining 
what is possible and feasible at that point (context). Second, in time that is 
generally understood as the basis of changes and differences. 
Laws are susceptible to all these influences of time. They are the result 
of previous traditions, which are subject to change. This fact establishes 
the content of what peace is and why it has to be temporary. 
Temporariness is a very important component of the structure of peace. It 
brings changes which produce differences. War is a borderline point of 
some of those changes in its potential to produce some of those 
differences. From the other side, war can thus also be regarded as a 
defence of the status quo. From the point of established justifications—
those justifications that are based in accepted reasons and the justificatory 
force of those reasons—there is a certain asymmetry which gives a 
principled primacy to the status quo in comparison to a change: an existing 
state of affairs, as already established, presumably has some justificatory 
reasons at its base, and the force of those reasons (the way that reasons 
function when they direct us to decide and do what we do) has already 
functioned as a motivational force for this state of affairs to be formed and 
accepted. The entire process is in a way accomplished in the past and what 
we have at the present moment thus has its raison d’être. Change-in-view, 
however, is not real, and as a process change at first is only a beginning 
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(or even something that precedes beginning, something only conceived), 
its reality in the future and uncertain. The power of some reasons to direct 
the action to its production is not in the same position as the same power 
of the justificatory reasons contained in something that already exists, it is 
necessarily underprivileged, and this power has to be proportionately 
stronger, strong enough, to facilitate the change. 
Opening a process of change implies opening a conflict with the status 
quo. And it is possible that this conflict at some point cannot proceed in a 
purely rational way and therefore will be unable to avoid violence, or rely 
only on the rational strength of reasons at some point of time. It is also 
possible that the conflict is such that it is not easy, or even possible, to end 
it and return to the starting point (or rather to the point before the starting 
point of the conflict). This is why it may be much easier to start an action 
such as a war than to stop it. In that case we may resort to violence as a 
path that allows the continuation of the conflict until its resolution. Thus, 
the defence of the status quo is rather obvious: the constitution, the laws, 
have to be defended. If one is under attack, defence is not just one of many 
options standing at his disposal, equal to all other options—it is the default 
action in response. One may give up defence, of course, but not in 
advance. This means that the status quo, which is always a particular 
peace with a specific structure of power distribution, is the subject of 
defence by default. This implies, however, that recourse to force is an 
option at all times; that war, not peace, has a priority here in a sense in 
which means have a priority over ends. Hence, part of the definition of 
peace is that it is a state of affairs in which war has been avoided. 
―Avoided‖ does not denote any necessity here: we just have been 
successful in not allowing war to occur. But we cannot say that war is an 
―avoided peace‖. Peace is the goal, war is not. War is only a means—a 
means to peace. There is no possibility of success in ―avoiding peace,‖ 
comparable to that of avoiding war: in a way this dialectical aspect of their 
relation is their dynamics. But the dynamics is strong: peace presupposes 
war, as a shield, as a refuge, as a defence. 
Unlike war, which is per definition temporary as a state of affairs that 
should end (the aim of war is to reach its conclusion!) peace has been 
normatively conceived as a permanent state of affairs. If we associate war 
with death, as we often do, we may associate peace with life. Let us 
therefore say that peace is the home of life. Obviously we do not think of 
absolute peace, one we have in graveyards, as Kant would say (Kant, 
8:343)—we have peace there, even absolute peace, but no life!—but a 
more dynamic state of affairs, one resembling life as usual. What makes 
peace so valuable is that it gives what is most important for and in life. For 
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our purposes here and phrased in the shortest way, peace is giving us 
control of time: through peace, we attain predictability. If we define life as 
the activity of setting goals and attempting to realize them, then it is 
obvious that life is future oriented and dependent on (some) capacity to 
control our future time. This is what laws give to us. Laws require and are 
dependent on peace. The main part of the definition of war corroborates 
this: it is per definition a suspension, a temporary suspension, of some 
important laws, and for that matter of some important rights and liberties. 
There is no controlled future in war: it is more as if the future during war 
resides in two periods, divided by a single point. That point is the end of 
war—the point of victory or defeat, the point of established peace. By 
giving us control of (future) time, peace is a central issue of social power, 
as well as an expression of its articulation and structure. 
The entire mechanism functions in the following way: the constitution 
and the laws in general have to be considered as worth the defence and 
defendable, and as in fact defended (as if the peace is the result of a 
successful defence, regardless of the fact that the peace is an outcome of a 
factual war). The attempt to defend the laws is always a strong 
motivational underpinning. Laws cannot function if they are proclaimed to 
be non-enforceable. Moreover, accepting non-defence would destroy all 
their enforceability. Every state has a legal duty to defend itself. This duty 
is also a moral duty, as long as the existence of (some, or any) laws has a 
moral justification. Hence, the interpretation of Kant‘s text as one 
implying a right (and duty?) to impel all (other) states to comply to one 
unique and unified law, to compel recalcitrant states to comply in order to 
―enter‖ a global juridical condition analogous to the civil condition, while 
proclaiming noncompliant states as outlaws (because they have a different 
articulation of their peace) and presuming the very reason that stands 
behind it—appears very totalitarian! For the freedom contained in laws, 
peace has to be taken as a ―truce‖—not as a perfect, final, ideal state of 
affairs from the end of time! That would destroy the difference between 
jurisprudence and morality, as well as the difference between legality and 
morality that is founded in the Categorical Imperative. Such morality 
states that the perfection of others must not be my concern, meaning that 
others may have whichever different motives for their actions as long as 
their actions conform to my external freedom. Consequently, privacy 
would be destroyed, while our lives would be policed. Furthermore, our 
entitlement to interfere in the domain of the freedom of others would be 
our right, even our duty. This logic is quite visible in the contemporary 
practice of humanitarian military interventions. Such actions strongly 
resemble police actions where the distribution of power and entitlement is 
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totally asymmetrical: all legitimate power and authority are exclusively on 
one side. 
Peace is a thick web of constraints created through mutual agreements, 
established expectations, threats of sanctions, laws, etc. All these 
constraints make many of our less than good ends much harder to realize, 
but they do not make those ends really impossible to achieve. The power 
of restricting freedom contained in laws is not perfectly efficient—
freedom always will be a reservoir of both of autonomy and violence. That 
is so because the civil condition is one of a repressed state of nature—
repressed but not ―abolished‖ and ―overcome.‖ Hence, if it is confronted 
with the abovementioned totalitarian ideal of pure and absolute peace, this 
repressed state of affairs might erupt as either total resignation, apathy 
(implying a passively approached lack of any possible consent), or as pure 
violence—being an expression of despair and helplessness, thereby 
indicating a lack of consent in an even stronger way. This would signal 
that peace has lost its formative power. It would be a sign that control has 
become unbearable and akin to slavery. The point of being free is to be 
what you are, not to be something else, nor to be under the control of 
something you do not identify with, something that is not you. And to be 
ruled is even more than to be controlled. If you are ruled by others without 
your (sincere) consent – regardless whether ―you‖ are an ―I‖ or a ―we‖, an 
individual human being or a people (and for that matter a state)—you are 
not free. 
The remedy here is simple: tolerance. There is no necessity, real or 
normative, that my constitution must be everyone‘s constitution. There is a 
pluralism of our appetites and desires (to survive, to be safe, to prosper—
quite Hobbesian)
9
 and what is necessary is not universal obedience but 
universal tolerance. It is the limits of possible identification that make 
tolerance necessary: I, as an autonomous individual, can delegate or 
transfer my freedom through my laws (confirmed through my consent) to 
my state, and in doing so I identify myself with a ―we‖ for whom these 
laws are ―our‖ laws. Universal identity does not seem to be possible: it 
would make any difference impossible and, what is more important, it 
would preclude dissent. This preclusion of dissent would make any 
consent redundant and irrelevant. The difference between my voluntary 
(free) participation in a collective legislative ―we‖ and my involuntary 
participation in it would be on a par, while my contribution in making 
collective decisions would become completely negligible and also 
redundant. Thus, the difference between freedom and slavery would be 
lost—not because it is empirically difficult for humankind to become that 
legislative ―we‖ that we all identify with, but because of a stronger logical 
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matter: because there is a need for others in a process of  identity 
formation (and identity is what a holder of autonomy has). 
It is easy to conceive that humans on Earth would unite in a possible 
defence against some danger coming from outer space. But the nature of 
this unification seems to be rather different depending on the nature of this 
danger: in case of a natural danger some form of cooperation and joint 
action would suffice. We should then expect the old system (or at least 
some state of affairs similar to the old one) to be re-established after the 
looming danger passes Only if the danger were an attack, meaning an 
attack carried out by some other rational beings, only then would it make 
sense to conceive of a unification which would create one nation on Earth, 
forcing all of us to unite not only in cooperation but also politically. And it 
is equally easy to conceive that this union, the result of this unification, 
would survive if the assaulting party also continues to constitute a threat. 
But, if we were to succeed in destroying the attackers entirely, it is very 
questionable whether the memory of what happened would suffice to 
transform the newly created union into a lasting nation! 
We can find a very fine corroboration of this in Kant. In paragraph 61 
of his The Metaphysics of Morals he says the following: ―...if an 
international (my emphasis) state... extends over too wide an area of land, 
it will eventually become impossible to govern it and thence to protect 
each of its members, and the multitude of corporations this would require 
(my emphasis) must again lead to a state of war. It naturally follows that 
perpetual peace, the ultimate end of all international right, is an idea 
incapable of realization‖ (Kant, 6:350; Nisbet‘s translation (Reiss, 
1971:§171). 
My own stance is that war is a necessary means to defend laws and 
peace. It is the matter of an articulation of the structure and distribution of 
social power: what will be the structure and the hierarchy of possibly 
legitimate ends, what will be the structure of the legitimate distribution of 
results and achievements, as well as which criteria will be accepted and 
applied to this. This defines who will rule and how, and what will be 
prohibited. In the end we can conclude that the structure of peace consists 
in who and what we are, what the content of our life is: which ends we set 
and attempt to realize. Those ends have to be rational (based on reasons) to 
be realizable, even if we were a society of devils (Kant, 8:366). They have 
to be arranged and ordered in a web of achievements and holdings, and 
this all is a specific structure and articulation of power. But all of this is 
possible because existence of laws allows predictability. Thus, this 
structure is in fact our—a very important part of us. It also includes a real 
possibility of war. Peace is what we are, but war is its part. The capacity to 
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choose evil is an inevitable and necessary part of our freedom (Babić, 
2004:248). We have good reasons not to fall prey to that part, but it will 
always be with us—as long as we are free. Therefore, despite peace being 
a state of affairs that successfully avoids war, its achievement is by 
definition temporary. It cannot become permanent. Kant seems to say the 
same, at least in The Metaphysics of Morals and Toward Perpetual Peace. 
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terms, translating them exclusively by ―it‖ and ―one‖ respectively. 
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law in the whole world), or 2) impelling ―others‖—i. e. other states—to enforce 
some viable law, i. e. their own law, and not allow a territory to be without any 
law; in this second case a lawlessness, or for that matter the incapacity to enforce 
the law, but not a fact that it is a different law, can be a casus belli. 
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5. Kant (8:355); but see also Nisbet translation: ―rights cannot be decided by 
military victory‖ (Reiss, 1971:104). 
6. Kant (8:348-9): ―A State of peace among men living together is not the same as 
the state of nature, which is rather a state of war.‖ Nisbet‘s translation: Reiss, 
1971:98). 
7. The translation here is Nisbet‘s, which again seems to be more appropriate than 
Mary Gregor‘s. The opposite standpoint would clearly violate the principle of 
moral equality of all those past, present and future humans with those who live 
prior to the establishment of the final lawful state of affairs, regarding respecting 
the decisions contained in their laws, including any feature of obligatoriness 
implied in those decisions and laws. 
8. Kant (8:365, my emphasis): ―Even if a people were not forced by internal 
discord to submit to the constraint of public laws, war would still force them from 
without to do so…‖ Cf. Ludwig (2004:74ff). 
9. Cf. for instance, Hobbes, 1981: Part I, Chapter VI, § 6. 
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